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Gradual Classical Logic for Attributed Objects
Ryuta Arisaka
INRIA Saclay–Iˆle-de-France, Campus de l’E´cole Polytechnique
Abstract—‘There is knowledge. There is belief. And there
is tacit agreement.’ ‘We may talk about objects. We may talk
about attributes of the objects. Or we may talk both about
objects and their attributes.’ This work inspects tacit agreements
on assumptions about the relation between objects and their
attributes, and studies a way of expressing them, presenting as
the result what we term gradual logic in which the sense of
truth gradually shifts. It extends classical logic instances with a
new logical connective capturing the object-attribute relation.
A formal semantics is presented. Decidability is proved. Para-
consistent/epistemic/conditional/intensional/description/combined
logics are compared.
I. INTRODUCTION
A short description There is a book. It is on desk. It is
titled ‘Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings’. It, or
the document from which the English translation was borne,
is written by Rene´ Descartes. Period
I1 have just described a book, not some freely arbitrary book
but one with a few pieces of information: that it is on desk, that
it has the said title, and that it is authored by Descartes. Let us
suppose that I am with a friend of mine. If I simply said There
is a book irrespective of being fully conscious that the book
that I have spotted is the described book and none others, the
friend of mine, who is here supposed oblivious of any articles
on the desk, would have no reason to go against imagining
whatever that is considered a book, say ‘Les Mise´rables’. The
short statement by itself does not forestall such a possibility.
By contrast, if, as in the description provided at the beginning,
I ask him to think of a laid-on-desk Rene´ Descartes book titled
‘Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings’, then there
would be certain logical dissonance if he should still think
of ‘Les Mise´rables’ as a possible option that conforms to the
given description. In innumerable occasions like this example,
adjectives (or adverbs or whatever terms that fulfil the same
purpose) are utilised to disambiguate terms that may denote
more than what we intend to communicate.
This feature of natural languages, allowing formulation
of a precise enough concept through coordination of (1)
broad concepts and (2) attributes that narrow down their
possibilities, is a very economical and suitable one for us.
For imagine otherwise that every word exactly identifies a
unique and indivisible object around us, then we would have
no abstract concepts such as generalisation or composition
since generalisation must assume specificity and composition
decomposability of what result from the process, neither of
which accords with the proposed code of the alternative
1‘We’ is preferred throughout this document save where the use of the term
is most unnatural.
language. While it is certain that concepts expressible in the
alternative language sustain no degree of ambiguity in what
they refer to, and in this sense it may be said to have an
advantage to our languages, the absence of abstract concepts
that we so often rely upon for reasoning is rather grave a
backlash that would stem its prospect for wide circulation,
because - after all - who is capable of showing knowledge of
an object that (s)he has never seen before; then who could
confidently assert that his/her listener could understand any
part of his/her speech on a matter that only he/she knows
of if all of us were to adopt the alternative language? By
contrast, concepts in our languages, being an identifier of a
group rather than an individual, allow generation of a vast
domain of discourse with a relatively small number of them
in aggregation, e.g. ‘book’ and ‘title’ cover anything that can
be understood as a book and/or a title, and they at the same
time enable refinement, e.g. ‘title’d ‘book’ denotes only those
books that are titled. The availability of mutually influencing
generic concepts adds to so much flexibility in our languages.
In this document, we will be interested in primitively
representing the particular relation between objects/concepts
(no special distinction between the two hereafter) and what
may form their attributes, which will lead to development of a
new logic. Our domain of discourse will range over certain set
of (attributed) objects (which may themselves be an attribute to
other (attributed) objects) and pure attributes that presuppose
existence of some (attributed) object as their host. Needless
to say, when we talk about or even just imagine an object
with some explicated attribute, the attribute must be found
among all that can become an attribute to it. To this extent it is
confined within the presumed existence of the object. The new
logic intends to address certain phenomena around attributed
objects which I think are reasonably common to us but which
may not be reasonably expressible in classical logic. Let us
turn to an example for illustration of the peculiar behaviour
that attributed objects often present to us.
A. On peculiarity of attributed objects as observed in nega-
tion, and on the truth ‘of’ classical logic
Episode Imagine that there is a tiny hat shop in our town,
having the following in stock:
1) 3 types of hats: orange hats, green hats ornamented with
some brooch, and blue hats decorated with some white
hat-shaped accessory, of which only the green and the
blue hats are displayed in the shop.
2) 2 types of shirts: yellow and blue, of which only the
blue shirts are displayed in the shop.
Imagine also that a young man has come to the hat shop.
After a while he asks the shop owner, a lady of many a year
of experience in hat-making; “Have you got a yellow hat?”
Well, obviously there are no yellow hats to be found in her
shop. She answers; “No, I do not have it in stock,” negating
the possibility that there is one in stock at her shop at the
present point of time. Period
But “what is she actually denying about?” is the inquiry that
I consider pertinent to this writing. We ponder; in delivering
the answer, the question posed may have allowed her to infer
that the young man was looking for a hat, a yellow hat in
particular. Then the answer may be followed by she saying;
“. . . but I do have hats with different colours including ones
not currently displayed.” That is, while she denies the presence
of a yellow hat, she still presumes the availability of hats of
which she reckons he would like to learn. It does not appear
so unrealistic, in fact, to suppose such a thought of hers that he
may be ready to compromise his preference for a yellow hat
with some non-yellow one, possibly an orange one in stock,
given its comparative closeness in hue to yellow.
Now, what if the young man turned out to be a town-
famous collector of yellow articles? Then it may be that from
his question she had divined instead that he was looking for
something yellow, a yellow hat in particular, in which case her
answer could have been a contracted form of “No, I do not
have it in stock, but I do have a yellow shirt nonetheless (as
you are looking after, I suppose?)”
Either way, these somewhat-appearing-to-be partial nega-
tions contrast with classical negation with which her answer
can be interpreted only as that she does not have a yellow hat,
nothing less, nothing more, with no restriction in the range of
possibilities outside it.
An analysis that I attempt regarding this sort of usual every-
day phenomenon around concepts and their attributes, which
leads for example to a case where negation of some concept
with attributes does not perforce entail negation of the concept
itself but only that of the attributes, is that presupposition of
a concept often becomes too strong in our mind to be invali-
dated. Let us proceed in allusion to logical/computer science
terminologies. In classical reasoning that we are familiar with,
1 - truth - is what we should consider is our truth and 0
- falsehood - is what we again should consider is our non-
truth. When we suppose a set of true atomic propositions
p, q, r, · · · under some possible interpretation of them, the truth
embodied in them does - by definition - neither transcend the
truth that the 1 signifies nor go below it. The innumerable true
propositions miraculously sit on the given definition of what is
true, 1. By applying alternative interpretations, we may have a
different set of innumerable true propositions possibly differ-
ing from the p, q, r, · · · . However, no interpretations are meant
to modify the perceived significance of the truth which remains
immune to them. Here what renders the truth so immutable
is the assumption of classical logic that no propositions that
cannot be given a truth value by means of the laws of classical
logic may appear as a proposition: there is nothing that is 30
% true, and also nothing that is true by the probability of 30
% unless, of course, the probability of 30 % should mean to
ascribe to our own confidence level, which I here assume is
not part of the logic, of the proposition being true.
However, one curious fact is that the observation made so
far can by no means preclude a deduction that, therefore and
no matter how controversial it may appear, the meaning of the
truth, so long as it can be observed only through the interpre-
tations that force the value of propositions to go coincident
with it and only through examination on the nature2 of those
propositions that were made true by them, must be invariably
dependant on the delimiter of our domain of discourse, the set
of propositions; on the presupposition of which are sensibly
meaningful the interpretations; on the presupposition of which,
in turn, is possible classical logic. Hence, quite despite the
actuality that for any set of propositions as can form a domain
of discourse for classical logic it is sufficient that there be only
one truth, it is not a priori possible that we find by certainty
any relation to hold between such individual truths and the
universal truth, if any, whom we cannot hope to successfully
invalidate. Nor is it a priori possible to sensibly impose a
restriction on any domain of discourse for classical reasoning
to one that is consistent with the universal truth, provided again
that such should exist. But, then, it is not by the force of
necessity that, having a pair of domains of discourse, we find
one individual truth and the other wholly interchangeable. In
tenor, suppose that truths are akin to existences, then just as
there are many existences, so are many truths, every one of
which can be subjected to classical reasoning, but no distinct
pairs of which a priori exhibit a trans-territorial compatibility.
But the lack of compatibility also gives rise to a possibility
of dependency among them within a meta-classical-reasoning
that recognises the many individual truths at once. In situations
where some concepts in a domain of discourse over which
reigns a sense of truth become too strong an assumption to be
feasibly falsified, the existence of the concepts becomes non-
falsifiable during the discourse of existences of their attributes
(which form another domain of discourse); it becomes a
delimiter of classical reasoning, that is, it becomes a ‘truth’
for them.
B. Gradual classical logic: a logic for attributed objects
It goes hopefully without saying that what I wished to
impart through the above fictitious episode was not so much
about which negation should take a precedence over the others
as about the distinction of objects and what may form their
attributes, i.e. about the inclusion relation to hold between the
two and about how it could restrict domains of discourse. If we
are to assume attributed objects as primitive entities in a logic,
we for example do not just have the negation that negates the
presence of an attributed object (attributed-object negation);
on the other hand, the logic should be able to express the
negation that applies to an attribute only (attribute negation)
and, complementary, we may also consider the negation that
applies to an object only (object negation). We should also
2Philosophical, that is, real, reading of the symbols p, q, r, . . . .
consider what it may mean to conjunctively/disjunctively have
several attributed objects and should attempt a construction of
the logic according to the analysis. I call the logic derived
from all these analysis gradual classical logic in which
the ‘truth’, a very fundamental property of classical logic,
gradually shifts by domains of discourse moving deeper into
attributes of (attributed) objects. For a special emphasis, here
the gradation in truth occurs only in the sense that is spelled
out in the previous sub-section. One in particular should not
confuse this logic with multi-valued logics [11], [12] that have
multiple truth values in the same domain of discourse, for any
(attributed) object in gradual classical logic assumes only one
out of the two usual possibilities: either it is true (that is,
because we shall essentially consider conceptual existences, it
is synonymous to saying that it exists) or it is false (it does not
exist). In this sense it is indeed classical logic. But in some
sense - because we can observe transitions in the sense of the
‘truth’ within the logic itself - it has a bearing of meta-classical
logic. As for inconsistency, if there is an inconsistent argument
within a discourse on attributed objects, wherever it may be
that it is occurring, the reasoning part of which is inconsistent
cannot be said to be consistent. For this reason it remains in
gradual classical logic just as strong as is in standard classical
logic.
C. Structure of this work
Shown below is the organisation of this work.
• Development of gradual classical logic (Sections I and
II).
• A formal semantics of gradual classical logic and a proof
that it is not para-consistent/inconsistent (Section III).
• Decidability of gradual classical logic (Section IV).
• Conclusion and discussion on related thoughts: para-
consistent logics, epistemic/conditional logics, intension-
al/description logics, and combined logic (Section V).
II. GRADUAL CLASSICAL LOGIC: LOGICAL PARTICULARS
In this section we shall look into logical particulars of
gradual classical logic. Some familiarity with propositional
classical logic, in particular with how the logical connectives
behave, is presumed. Mathematical transcriptions of gradual
classical logic are found in the next section.
A. Logical connective for object/attribute and interactions
with negation (⋗ and ¬)
It was already mentioned that the inclusion relation that
is implicit when we talk about an attributed object shall
be primitive in the proposed gradual classical logic. We
shall dedicate the symbol ⋗ to represent it. The usage of
the new connective is fixed to take either of the forms
Object
1
⋗ Object
2
or Object
1
⋗ Attribute2. Both denote an
attributed object. In the first case, Object1 is a more generic
object than Object
1
⋗Object
2
(Object
2
acting as an attribute to
Object
1
makes Object
1
more specific). In the second case, we
have a pure attribute which is not itself an object. Either way
a schematic reading is as follows: “It is true that Object
1
is,
and it is true that Object1 has an attribute of Object2 (, or of
Attribute2).” Given an attributed object Object1 ⋗ Ojbect2
(or Object
1
⋗ Attribute2), ¬(Object1 ⋗ Object2) expresses
its attributed object negation, ¬Object1 ⋗ Object2 its object
negation and Object
1
⋗¬Object
2
its attribute negation. Again
schematic readings for them are, respectively;
• It is false that the attributed object Object1 ⋗ Object2 is
(Cf. above for the reading of ‘an attribute object is’).
• It is false that Object
1
is, but it is true that some non-
Object1 is which has an attribute of Object2.
• It is true that Object
1
is, but it is false that it has an
attribute of Object
2
.
The presence of negation flips “It is true that . . . ” into “It
is false that . . . ” and vice versa. But it should be also noted
how negation acts in attribute negations and object/attribute
negations. Several specific examples3 constructed parodically
from the items in the hat shop episode are;
1) Hat⋗Yellow: It is true that hat is, and it is true that it is
yellow(ed).
2) Yellow⋗ Hat: It is true that yellow is, and it is true that
it is hatted.
3) Hat⋗ ¬Yellow: It is true that hat is, but it is false that it
is yellow(ed).4
4) ¬Hat ⋗ Yellow: It is false that hat is, but it is true that
yellow object (which is not hat) is.
5) ¬(Hat ⋗ Yellow): Either it is false that hat is, or if it is
true that hat is, then it is false that it is yellow.
B. Object/attribute relation and conjunction (⋗ and ∧)
We examine specific examples first involving ⋗ and ∧
(conjunction), and then observe what the readings imply.
1) Hat⋗ Green ∧ Brooch: It is true that hat is, and it is true
that it is green and brooched.
2) (Hat⋗Green)∧ (Hat⋗Brooch): for one, it is true that hat
is, and it is true that it is green; for one, it is true that
hat is, and it is true that it is brooched.
3) (Hat∧Shirt)⋗Yellow: It is true that hat and shirt are, and
it is true that they are yellow.
4) (Hat ⋗ Yellow) ∧ (Shirt ⋗ Yellow): for one, it is true that
hat is, and it is true that it is yellow; for one, it is true
that shirt is, and it is true that it is yellow.
By now it has hopefully become clear that by existential facts
as truths I do not mean how many of a given (attributed) object
exist: in gradual classical logic, cardinality of objects, which
is an important pillar in the philosophy of linear logic [10] and
that of its kinds of so-called resource logics, is not what it must
be responsible for, but only the facts themselves of whether
any of them exist in a given domain of discourse, which is
in line with classical logic.5 Hence they univocally assume
3I do not pass judgement on what is reasonable and what is not here, as
my purpose is to illustrate the reading of ⋗. So there are ones that ordinarily
appear to be not very reasonable.
4In the rest, this -ed to indicate an adjective is assumed clear and is omitted
another emphasis.
5That proposition A is true and that proposition A is true mean that
proposition A is true; the subject of this sentence is equivalent to the object
of its.
a singular than plural form, as in the examples inscribed
so far. That the first and the second, and the third and the
fourth, equate is then a trite observation. Nevertheless, it is
still important that we analyse them with a sufficient precision.
In the third and the fourth where the same attribute is shared
among several objects, the attribute of being yellow ascribes to
all of them. Therefore those expressions are a true statement
only if (1) there is an existential fact that both hat and shirt are
and (2) being yellow is true for the existential fact (formed by
existence of hat and that of shirt). Another example is found
in Figure 1.
Brooch Shirt Hat
Large Yellow Hat
(Object)
(Attribute)
(
⋗
)
Fig. 1: Illustration of an expression ((Brooch∧Shirt)⋗Large)∧
((Brooch ∧ Shirt ∧ Hat) ⋗ Yellow) ∧ (Hat ⋗ Hat): the existential
fact of the attribute large depends on the existential facts of
brooch and shirt; the existential fact of the attribute of being
yellow depends on the existential facts of brooch, shirt and
hat; and the existential fact of the attribute hat depends on the
existential fact of hat to which it is an attribute.
C. Object/attribute relation and disjunction (⋗ and ∨)
We look at examples first.
1) Hat ⋗ (Hat ∨ Brooch): It is true that hat is, and it is true
that it is either hatted or brooched.
2) (Hat⋗Hat)∨ (Hat⋗Brooch): At least either that it is true
that hat is and it is true that it is hatted, or that it is true
that hat is and it is true that it is brooched.
3) (Hat∨ Shirt)⋗Yellow: It is true that at least either hat or
shirt is, and it is true that whichever is existing (or both)
is (or are) yellow.
4) (Hat⋗Yellow)∨ (Shirt⋗Yellow): At least either it is true
that hat is and it is true that it is yellow, or it is true that
shirt is and it is true that it is yellow.
Just as in the previous sub-section, here again 1) and 2), and
3) and 4) are equivalent. However, in the cases of 3) and 4)
here, we have that the existential fact of the attribute yellow
depends on that of hat or shirt, whichever is existing, or that
of both if they both exist.6
D. Nestings of object/attribute relations
An expression of the kind (Object
1
⋗Object
2
)⋗Object
3
is
ambiguous. But we begin by listing examples and then move
onto analysis of the readings of the nesting of the relations.
1) (Hat ⋗ Brooch) ⋗ Green: It is true that hat is, and it is
true that it is brooched. It is true that the object thus
described is green.
6In classical logic, that proposition A or proposition B is true means that
at least one of the proposition A or the proposition B is true though both can
be true. Same goes here.
2) Hat ⋗ (Hat ⋗White): It is true that hat is, and it is true
that it has the attribute of which it is true that hat is and
that it is white. (More simply, it is true that hat is, and
it is true that it is white-hatted.)
3) ¬(Hat⋗Yellow)⋗Brooch: Either it is false that hat is, or
else it is true that hat is but it is false that it is yellow.7 If
it is false that hat is, then it is true that brooched object
(which obviously cannot be hat) is. If it is true that hat
is but it is false that it is yellow, then it is true that the
object thus described is brooched.
Note that to say that Hat ⋗ Brooch (brooched hat) is being
green, we must mean to say that the object to the attribute of
being green, i.e. hat, is green. It is on the other hand unclear
if green brooched hat should or should not mean that the
brooch, an accessory to hat, is also green. But common sense
about adjectives dictates that such be simply indeterminate.
It is reasonable for (Hat ⋗ Brooch) ⋗ Green, while if we
have (Hat ⋗ Large) ⋗ Green, ordinarily speaking it cannot be
the case that the attribute of being large is green. Therefore
we enforce that (Object
1
⋗ Object
2
) ⋗ Object
3
amounts to
(Object1 ⋗ Object3) ∧ ((Object1 ⋗ Object2) ∨ (Object1 ⋗
(Object
2
⋗ Object
3
))) in which disjunction as usual captures
the indeterminacy. 2) poses no ambiguity. 3) is understood in
the same way as 1).
E. Two nullary logical connectives ⊤ and ⊥
Now we examine the nullary logical connectives ⊤ and ⊥
which denote, in classical logic, the concept of the truth and
that of the inconsistency. In gradual classical logic ⊤ denotes
the concept of the presence and ⊥ denotes that of the absence.
Several examples for the readings are;
1) ⊤⋗ Yellow: It is true that yellow object is.
2) Hat ⋗ (⊤ ⋗ Yellow): It is true that hat is, and it is true
that it has the following attribute of which it is true that
it is yellow object.
3) ⊥ ⋗ Yellow: It is true that nothingness is, and it is true
that it is yellow.
4) Hat⋗⊤: It is true that hat is.
5) Hat⋗⊥: It is true that hat is, and it is true that it has no
attributes.
6) ⊥ ⋗ ⊥: It is true that nothingness is, and it is true that
it has no attributes.
1) and 2) illustrate how the sense of the ‘truth’ is constrained
by the object to which it acts as an attribute. For the rest,
however, there is a point around the absence which is not so
vacuous as not to merit a consideration, and to which I in fact
append the following postulate.
Postulate 1: That which cannot have any attribute is not.
Conversely, anything that remains once all the attributes have
been removed from a given object is nothingness for which
any scenario where it comes with an attribute is inconceivable.
With it, 3) which asserts the existence of nothingness is
contradictory. 4) then behaves as expected in that Hat which
7This is the reading of ¬(Hat⋗ Yellow).
is asserted with the presence of attribute(s) is just as generic a
term as Hat itself is. 5) which asserts the existence of an object
with no attributes again contradicts Postulate 1. 6) illustrates
that any attributed object in some part of which has turned out
to be contradictory remains contradictory no matter how it is
to be extended: a ⊥ cannot negate another ⊥.
But how plausible is the postulate itself? Let us imagine
hat. If the word evoked in our mind any specific hat with
specific colour and shape, we first remove the colour out of it.
If the process should make it transparent, we then remove the
transparentness away from it. And if there should be still some
things that are by some means perceivable as have originated
from it, then because they are an attribute of the hat, we again
remove any one of them. If the humanly no longer detectable
something is not nothingness is not itself contradictory, then
there must be still some quality originating in the hat that
makes the something differ from nothingness. But the quality
must again be an attribute to the hat, which we decisively
remove away. Therefore, at least intuition solidifies the validity
of Postulate 1. A further pursuit on this topic may be useful.
For now, however, we shall draw a direct support from - among
others - Transcendental Aesthetic in Critique of Pure Reason
(English translation [14]), and close the scene.
F. Sub-Conclusion
Gradual classical logic was developed in Section I and
Section II. The next two sections Section III and Section IV
study its mathematical aspects.
III. MATHEMATICAL MAPPINGS: SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS
In this section a semantics of gradual classical logic is
formalised. We assume in the rest of this document;
• N denotes the set of natural numbers including 0.
• ∧† and ∨† are two binary operators on Boolean arithmetic.
The following laws hold; 1 ∨† 1 = 1 ∨† 0 = 0 ∨† 1 = 1,
0 ∧† 0 = 0 ∧† 1 = 1 ∧† 0 = 0, and 1 ∧† 1 = 1.
• ∧†, ∨† →†, ¬†, ∃ and ∀ are meta-logical connectives:
conjunction, disjunction,8 material implication, negation,
existential quantification and universal quantification,
whose semantics follow those of standard classical logic.
We abbreviate (A→† B) ∧† (B →† A) by A↔† B.
• Binding strength of logical or meta-logical connectives
is, in the order of decreasing precedence;
[¬]≫ [∧ ∨]≫ [⋗]≫ [∀ ∃]≫ [¬†]≫ [∧† ∨†]≫ [→†]≫ [↔†].
• For any binary connectives ?, for any i, j ∈ N and for
!0, !1, · · · , !j that are some recognisable entities, ?
j
i=0!i is
an abbreviation of (!0)?(!1)? · · ·?(!j).
• For the unary connective ¬, ¬¬! for some recognisable
entity ! is an abbreviation of ¬(¬!). Further, ¬k! for some
k ∈ N and some recognisable entity ! is an abbreviation
of ¬ · · · ¬︸ ︷︷ ︸
k
!.
8These two symbols are overloaded. Save whether truth values or the ternary
values are supplied as arguments, however, the distinction is clear from the
context in which they are used.
• For the binary connective ⋗, !0⋗!1⋗!2 for some three
recognisable entities is an abbreviation of !0 ⋗ (!1⋗!2).
On this preamble we shall begin.
A. Development of semantics
The set of literals in gradual classical logic is denoted by
A whose elements are referred to by a with or without a sub-
script. This set has a countably many number of literals. Given
a literal a ∈ A, its complement is denoted by ac which is in
A. As usual, we have ∀a ∈ A.(ac)c = a. The set A∪{⊤}∪{⊥}
where ⊤ and ⊥ are the two nullary logical connectives is
denoted by S . Its elements are referred to by s with or without
a sub-script. Given s ∈ S , its complement is denoted by sc
which is in S . Here we have ⊤c = ⊥ and ⊥c = ⊤. The set of
formulas is denoted by F whose elements, F with or without
a sub-/super-script, are finitely constructed from the following
grammar;
F := s | F ∧ F | F ∨ F | ¬F | F ⋗ F
We now develop semantics. This is done in two parts: we
do not outright jump to the definition of valuation (which we
could, but which we simply do not choose in anticipation for
later proofs). Instead, just as we only need consider negation
normal form in classical logic because every classical logic
formula definable has a reduction into a normal form, so
shall we first define rules for formula reductions (for any
F1, F2, F3 ∈ F):
• ∀s ∈ S .¬s 7→ sc (¬ reduction 1).
• ¬(F1 ∧ F2) 7→ ¬F1 ∨ ¬F2 (¬ reduction 2).
• ¬(F1 ∨ F2) 7→ ¬F1 ∧ ¬F2 (¬ reduction 3).
• ¬(s⋗ F2) 7→ s
c ∨ (s⋗ ¬F2) (¬ reduction 4).
• (F1 ⋗F2)⋗F3 7→ (F1 ⋗F3)∧ ((F1 ⋗F2)∨ (F1 ⋗F2 ⋗F3))
(⋗ reduction 1).
• (F1 ∧ F2)⋗ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F3) ∧ (F2 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 2).
• (F1 ∨ F2)⋗ F3 7→ (F1 ⋗ F3) ∨ (F2 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 3).
• F1 ⋗ (F2 ∧ F3) 7→ (F1 ⋗ F2) ∧ (F1 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 4).
• F1 ⋗ (F2 ∨ F3) 7→ (F1 ⋗ F2) ∨ (F1 ⋗ F3) (⋗ reduction 5).
Definition 1 (Valuation frame): Let S∗ denote the set union
of (A) the set of finite sequences of elements of S9 and (B)
a singleton set {ǫ} denoting an empty sequence. We define a
valuation frame as a 2-tuple: (I, J), where I : S∗ × S → {0, 1}
is what we call local interpretation and J : S∗\{ǫ} → {0, 1} is
what we call gloal interpretation. The following are defined to
satisfy.
Regarding local interpretation
• [I(s0. . . . .sk−1,⊤) = 1]
10 (I valuation of ⊤).
• [I(s0. . . . .sk−1,⊥) = 0] (That of ⊥).
• [I(s0. . . . .sk−1, ak) = 0]∨
† [I(s0. . . . .sk−1, ak) = 1]
(That of a literal).
• [I(s0. . . . .sk−1, ak) = 0] ↔
† [I(s0. . . . .sk−1, a
c
k) =
1] (That of a complement).
9Simply for a presentation purpose, we use comma such as s∗1.s
∗
2 for
s∗1, s
∗
2 ∈ S
∗
to show that s∗1.s
∗
2 is an element of S
∗
in which s∗1 is the
preceding constituent and s∗2 the following constituent of s
∗
1.s
∗
2 .
10When k = 0, we assume that [I(s0. . . . .sk−1, sk) = I(ǫ, s0)]. Same
applies in the rest.
• [I(s0. . . . .sk−1, sk) = I(s
′
0. . . . .s
′
k−1, sk)]
(Synchronization condition on I interpretation;
this reflects the dependency of the existential
fact of an attribute to the existential fact of
objects to which it is an attribute).
Regarding global interpretation
• [J(s0. . . . .sk) = 1] ↔
† ∀i ∈
N.
∧†k
i=0
[I(s0. . . . .si−1, si) = 1] (Non-
contradictory J valuation).
• [J(s0. . . . .sk) = 0] ↔
† ∃i ∈ N.[i ≤ k] ∧†
[I(s0. . . . .si−1, si) = 0] (Contradictory J valua-
tion).
Note that global interpretation is completely characterised by
local interpretations, as clear from the definition.
Definition 2 (Valuation): Suppose a valuation frame M =
(I, J). The following are defined to hold for all F1, F2 ∈ F and
for all k ∈ N:
• [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk] = J(s0.s1. . . . .sk).
• [M |= F1 ∧ F2] = [M |= F1] ∧
† [M |= F2].
• [M |= F1 ∨ F2] = [M |= F1] ∨
† [M |= F2].
The notions of validity and satisfiability are as usual.
Definition 3 (Validity/Satisfiability): A formula F ∈ F is
said to be satisfiable in a valuation frame M iff 1 = [M |= F ];
it is said to be valid iff it is satisfiable for all the valuation
frames; it is said to be invalid iff 0 = [M |= F ] for some
valuation frame M; it is said to be unsatisfiable iff it is invalid
for all the valuation frames.
B. Study on the semantics
We have not yet formally verified some important points.
Are there, firstly, any formulas F ∈ F that do not reduce
into some value-assignable formula? Secondly, what if both
1 = [M |= F ] and 1 = [M |= ¬F ], or both 0 = [M |= F ] and
0 = [M |= ¬F ] for some F ∈ F under some M? Thirdly, should
it happen that [M |= F ] = 0 = 1 for any formula F , given a
valuation frame?
If the first should hold, the semantics - the reductions and
valuations as were presented in the previous sub-section -
would not assign a value (values) to every member of F even
with the reduction rules made available. If the second should
hold, we could gain 1 = [M |= F ∧¬F ], which would relegate
this gradual logic to a family of para-consistent logics [17] -
quite out of keeping with my intention. And the third should
never hold, clearly.
Hence it must be shown that these unfavoured situations do
not arise. An outline to the completion of the proofs is;
1) to establish that every formula has a reduction through
¬ reductions and ⋗ reductions into some formula F for
which it holds that ∀M.[M |= F ] ∈ {0, 1}, to settle down
the first inquiry.
2) to prove that any formula F to which a value 0/1 is
assignable without the use of the reduction rules satisfies
for every valuation frame (a) that [M |= F ] ∨† [M |=
¬F ] = 1 and [M |= F ] ∧† [M |= ¬F ] = 0; and (b) either
that 0 6= 1 = [M |= F ] or that 1 6= 0 = [M |= F ], to settle
down the other inquiries partially.
3) to prove that the reduction through ¬ reductions and ⋗
reductions on any formula F ∈ F is normal in that, in
whatever order those reduction rules are applied to F ,
any Freduced in the set of possible formulas it reduces
into satisfies for every valuation frame either that [M |=
Freduced ] = 1, or that [M |= Freduced ] = 0, for all such
Freduced , to conclude.
1) Every formula is 0/1-assignable: We state several defi-
nitions for the first objective of ours.
Definition 4 (Chains/Unit chains):
A chain is defined to be any formula F ∈ F such that F =
F0 ⋗ F1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ Fk+1 for k ∈ N. A unit chain is defined to be
a chain for which Fi ∈ S for all 0 ≤ i ≤ k + 1. We denote
the set of unit chains by U. By the head of a chain F ∈ F, we
mean some formula Fa ∈ F satisfying (1) that Fa is not in the
form Fb ⋗ Fc for some Fb, Fc ∈ F and (2) that F = Fa ⋗ Fd
for some Fd ∈ F. By the tail of a chain F ∈ F, we then mean
some formula Fd ∈ F such that F = Fa ⋗ Fd for some Fa as
the head of F .
Definition 5 (Unit chain expansion):
Given any F ∈ F, we say that F is expanded in unit chains
only if any chain that occurs in F is a unit chain.
Definition 6 (Formula size): The size of a formula is de-
fined inductively. Let F be some arbitrary formula, and let
f size(F ) be the formula size of F . Then it holds that;
• f size(F ) = 1 if F ∈ S .
• f size(F ) = f size(F1)+f size(F2)+1 if F = F1∧F2,
F = F1 ∨ F2, or F = F1 ⋗ F2.
• f size(F ) = f size(F1) + 1 if F = ¬F1.
Definition 7 (Maximal number of ¬ nestings):
Given a formula F ∈ F, we denote by neg max(F ) a maximal
number of ¬ nestings in F , whose definition goes as follows;
• If F0 = s, then neg max(F0) = 0.
• If F0 = F1 ∧ F2 or F0 = F1 ∨ F2 or F0 = F1 ⋗ F2, then
neg max(F0) = max(neg max(F1), neg max(F2)).
• If F0 = ¬F1, then neg max(F0) = 1 + neg max(F1).
We now work on the main results.
Lemma 1 (Linking principle): Let F1 and F2 be two formu-
las in unit chain expansion. Then it holds that F1 ⋗ F2 has a
reduction into a formula in unit chain expansion.
Proof: In Appendix A.
Lemma 2 (Reduction without negation): Any formula F0 ∈
F in which no ¬ occurs reduces into some formula in unit
chain expansion.
Proof: By induction on formula size. For inductive cases,
consider what F0 actually is:
1) F0 = F1∧F2 or F0 = F1∨F2: Apply induction hypothesis
on F1 and F2.
2) F0 = F1 ⋗ F2: Apply induction hypothesis on F1 and
F2 to get F
′
1 ⋗ F
′
2 where F
′
1 and F
′
2 are formulas in unit
chain expansion. Then apply Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 (Reduction): Any formula F0 ∈ F reduces into
some formula in unit chain expansion.
Proof: By induction on maximal number of ¬ nestings
and a sub-induction on formula size. Lemma 2 for base cases.
Details are in Appendix B.
Lemma 4: For any F ∈ F expanded in unit chains, there
exists v ∈ {0, 1} such that [M |= F ] = v for any valuation
frame.
Proof: Since a value 0/1 is assignable to any element of
S ∪ U by Definition 2, it is (or they are if more than one in
{0, 1}) assignable to [M |= F ].
Hence we obtain the desired result for the first objective.
Proposition 1: To any F ∈ F corresponds at least one
formula Fa in unit chain expansion into which F reduces. It
holds for any such Fa that [M |= Fa] ∈ {0, 1} for any valuation
frame.
For the next sub-section, the following observation about
negation on a unit chain comes in handy. Let us state a
procedure.
Definition 8 (Procedure recursiveReduce):
The procedure given below takes as an input a formula F in
unit chain expansion.
Description of recursiveReduce(F )
1) Replace ∧ in F with ∨, and ∨ with ∧. These two
operations are simultaneous.
2) Replace all the non-chains s ∈ S in F simultaneously
with sc (∈ S).
3) For every chain Fa in F with its head s ∈ S for
some s and its tail Ftail, replace Fa with (s
c ∨ (s ⋗
(recursiveReduce(Ftail)))).
4) Reduce F via ⋗ reductions in unit chain expansion.
Then we have the following result.
Proposition 2 (Reduction of negated unit chain expansion):
Let F be a formula in unit chain expansion. Then ¬F reduces
via the ¬ and ⋗ reductions into recursiveReduce(F ).
Moreover recursiveReduce(F ) is the unique reduction of
¬F . Proof: For the uniqueness, observe that only ¬ reductions
and ⋗ reduction 5 are used in reduction of ¬F , and that at
any point during the reduction, if there occurs a sub-formula
in the form ¬Fx, the sub-formula Fx cannot be reduced by
any reduction rules. Then the proof of the uniqueness is
straightforward.
2) Unit chain expansions form Boolean algebra:
We make use of disjunctive normal form in this sub-section
for simplification of proofs.
Definition 9 (Disjunctive/Conjunctive normal form): A
formula F ∈ F is defined to be in disjunctive normal form
only if ∃i, j, k ∈ N ∃h0, · · · , hi ∈ N ∃f00, . . . , fkhk ∈ U ∪ S .F =
∨ki=0 ∧
hi
j=0 fij . Dually, a formula F ∈ F is defined to be in
conjunctive normal form only if ∃i, j, k ∈ N ∃h0, · · · , hi ∈
N ∃f00, . . . , fkhk ∈ U ∪ S .F = ∧
k
i=0 ∨
hi
j=0 fij .
Now, for the second objective of ours, we prove that U ∪ S ,
recursiveReduce, ∨† and ∧† form a Boolean algebra (Cf.
[20] for the laws of Boolean algebra), from which follows
the required outcome.
Proposition 3 (Annihilation/Identity): For any formula F in
unit chain expansion and for any valuation frame, it holds (1)
that [M |= ⊤∧F ] = [M |= F ]; (2) that [M |= ⊤∨F ] = [M |= ⊤];
(3) that [M |= ⊥∧ F ] = [M |= ⊥]; and (4) that [M |= ⊥∨ F ] =
[M |= F ].
Lemma 5 (Elementary complementation): For any s0⋗s1⋗
· · ·⋗ sk ∈ U∪S for some k ∈ N, if for a given valuation frame
it holds that [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk] = 1, then it also holds
that [M |= recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk)] = 0; or if it
holds that [M |= s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk] = 0, then it holds that
[M |= recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk)] = 1. These two
events are mutually exclusive.
Proof: In Appendix C.
Proposition 4 (Associativity/Commutativity/Distributivity):
Given any formulas F1, F2, F3 ∈ F in unit chain expansion
and any valuation frame M, the following hold:
1) [M |= F1] ∧
† ([M |= F2] ∧
† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∧
†
[M |= F2]) ∧
† [M |= F3] (associativity 1).
2) [M |= F1] ∨
† ([M |= F2] ∨
† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∨
†
[M |= F2]) ∨
† F3 (associativity 2).
3) [M |= F1] ∧
† [M |= F2] = [M |= F2] ∧
† [M |= F1]
(commutativity 1).
4) [M |= F1] ∨
† [M |= F2] = [M |= F2] ∨
† [M |= F1]
(commutativity 2).
5) [M |= F1] ∧
† ([M |= F2] ∨
† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∧
†
[M |= F2]) ∨
† ([M |= F1] ∧
† [M |= F3]) (distributivity 1).
6) [M |= F1] ∨
† ([M |= F2] ∧
† [M |= F3]) = ([M |= F1] ∨
†
[M |= F2]) ∧
† ([M |= F1] ∨
† [M |= F3]) (distributivity 2).
Proof: Make use of Lemma 5. Details are in Appendix
D.
Proposition 5 (Idempotence and Absorption):
Given any formula F1, F2 ∈ F in unit chain
expansion, for any valuation frame it holds that
[M |= F1] ∧
† [M |= F1] = [M |= F1] ∨
† [M |= F1] = [M |= F1]
(idempotence); and that [M |= F1]∧
† ([M |= F1]∨
† [M |= F2]) =
[M |= F1]∨
† ([M |= F1]∧
† [M |= F2]) = [M |= F1] (absorption).
Proof: Both F1, F2 are assigned one and only one value
v ∈ {0, 1} (Cf. Appendix D). Trivial to verify.
We now prove laws involving recursiveReduce.
Lemma 6 (Elementary double negation): Let F denote
s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk ∈ U ∪ S for some k ∈ N. Then for
any valuation frame it holds that [M |= F ] = [M |=
recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F ))].
Proof: recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F )) is in con-
junctive normal form. Transform this to disjunctive normal
form, and observe that almost all the clauses are assigned 0.
Details are in Appendix E.
Proposition 6 (Complementation/Double negation):
For any F in unit chain expansion and for any valuation
frame, it holds that 1 = [M |= F ∨ recursiveReduce(F )]
and that 0 = [M |= F ∧ recursiveReduce(F )] (complemen-
tation). Also, for any F ∈ F in unit chain expansion and
for any valuation frame it holds that [M |= F ] = [M |=
recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F ))] (double negation).
Proof: Make use of disjunctive normal form, Lemma 5
and Lemma 6. Details are in Appendix F.
Theorem 1: Denote by X the set of the expressions com-
prising all [M |= fx] for fx ∈ U ∪ S . Then for every valuation
frame, (X, recursiveReduce,∧†,∨†) defines a Boolean alge-
bra.
Proof: Follows from earlier propositions and lemmas.
3) Gradual classical logic is neither para-consistent nor
inconsistent :
To achieve the last objective we assume two notations.
Definition 10 (Sub-formula notation): Given a formula F ∈
F, we denote by F [Fa] the fact that Fa occurs as a sub-formula
in F . Here the definition of a sub-formula of a formula follows
one that is found in standard textbooks on logic [15]. F itself
is a sub-formula of F .
Definition 11 (Small step reductions): By F1  F2 for
some formulas F1 and F2 we denote that F1 reduces in one
reduction step into F2. By F1  r F2 we denote that the
reduction holds explicitly by a reduction rule r (which is
either of the 7 rules). By F1  
∗ F2 we denote that F1 reduces
into F2 in a finite number of steps including 0 step in which
case F1 is said to be irreducible. By F1  
k F2 we denote
that the reduction is in exactly k steps. By F1  
∗
{r1,r2,··· }
F2
or F1  
k
{r1,r2,··· }
F2 we denote that the reduction is via those
specified rules r1, r2, · · · only.
Along with them, we also enforce that F(F ) denote the set of
formulas in unit chain expansion that F ∈ F can reduce into.
A stronger result than Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 7 (Bisimulation without negation): Assumed
below are pairs of formulas in which ¬ does not occur.
F ′ differs from F only by the shown sub-formulas, i.e. F ′
derives from F by replacing the shown sub-formula for F ′
with the shown sub-formula for F and vice versa. Then for
each pair (F, F ′) below, it holds for every valuation frame
that [M |= F1] = [M |= F2] for all F1 ∈ F(F ) and for all
F2 ∈ F(F
′).
F [(Fa ∧ Fb)⋗ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]
F [(Fa ∨ Fb)⋗ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∨ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ⋗ (Fb ∧ Fc)] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∧ (Fa ⋗ Fc)]
F [Fa ⋗ (Fb ∨ Fc)] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fb) ∨ (Fa ⋗ Fc)]
F [(Fa ⋗ Fb)⋗ Fc] , F
′[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ ((Fa ⋗ Fb) ∨ (Fa ⋗ Fb ⋗ Fc))]
Proof: By induction on the number of reduction steps
and a sub-induction on formula size in each direction of
bisimulation. Details are in Appendix G.
Lemma 8 (Other bisimulations): For each pair (F ∈ F, F ′ ∈
F) below, it holds for every valuation frame (1) that ∀F1 ∈
F(F ).∃F2 ∈ F(F
′).[M |= F1] = [M |= F2] and (2) that ∀F2 ∈
F(F ′).∃F1 ∈ F(F ).[M |= F1] = [M |= F2]. Once again, F and
F ′ differ only by the shown sub-formulas.
F [¬(Fa ∧ Fb)] , F
′[¬Fa ∨ ¬Fb]
F [¬(Fa ∨ Fb)] , F
′[¬Fa ∧ ¬Fb]
F [s ∨ s] , F ′[s]
F [s ∨ Fa ∨ s] , F
′[s ∨ Fa]
F [s ∧ s] , F ′[s]
F [s ∧ Fa ∧ s] , F
′[s ∧ Fa]
F [sc] , F ′[¬s]
Proof: By simultaneous induction on the number of
reduction steps and a sub-induction on formula size. Details
are in Appendix H.
Lemma 9 (Normalisation without negation): Given a for-
mula F ∈ F, if ¬ does not occur in F , then it holds for every
valuation frame either that [M |= Fa] = 1 for all Fa ∈ F(F ) or
else that [M |= Fa] = 0 for all Fa ∈ F(F ).
Proof: Consequence of Lemma 7.
Theorem 2 (Normalisation): Given a formula F ∈ F, de-
note the set of formulas in unit chain expansion that it can
reduce into by F1. Then it holds for every valuation frame
either that [M |= Fa] = 1 for all Fa ∈ F1 or else that
[M |= Fa] = 0 for all Fa ∈ F1.
Proof: By induction on maximal number of ¬ nestings
and a sub-induction on formula size. We quote Lemma 9 for
base cases. Details are in Appendix I.
By the result of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we may define
implication: F1 ⊃ F2 to be an abbreviation of ¬F1∨F2 - exactly
the same - as in classical logic.
IV. DECIDABILITY
We show a decision procedure
∮
for universal validity of
some input formula F . Here, z : Z for some z and Z denotes
a variable z of type Z. Also assume a terminology of ‘object
level’, which is defined inductively. Given F in unit chain
expansion, (A) if s ∈ S in F occurs as a non-chain or as a
head of a unit chain, then it is said to be at the 0-th object
level. (B) if it occurs in a unit chain as s0 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk ⋗ s or as
s0 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk ⋗ s ⋗ ... for some k ∈ N and some s0, . . . , sk ∈
S , then it is said to be at the (k+1)-th object level. Further,
assume a function toSeq : N→ S∗ satisfying toSeq(0) = ǫ and
toSeq(k + 1) = ⊤. . . . .⊤︸ ︷︷ ︸
k+1
.
∮
(F : F,object level : N)
returning either 0 or 1
\\ This pseudo-code uses n, o : N, Fa, Fb : F.
L0: Duplicate F and assign the copy to Fa. If Fa
is not already in unit chain expansion, then reduce
it into a formula in unit chain expansion.
L1: Fb := EXTRACT(Fa, object level).
L2: n := COUNT DISTINCT(Fb).
L30: For each I : toSeq(object level)× S distinct
for the n elements of S at the given object level,
Do:
L31: If UNSAT(Fb, I), then go to L5.
L32: Else if no unit chains occur in Fa, go to L35.
L33: o :=
∮
(REWRITE(Fa, I, object level),
object level+ 1).
L34: If o = 0, go to L5.
L35: End of For Loop.
L4: return 1. \\ Yes.
L5: return 0. \\ No.
EXTRACT(F : F, object level : N) returning F ′ : F
L0: F ′ := F .
L1: For every s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk for some k ∈ N
greater than or equal to object level and some
s0, s1, . . . , sk ∈ S occurring in F
′, replace it with
s0 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sobject level .
L2: return F ′.
COUNT DISTINCT(F : F) returning n : N
L0: return n := (number of distinct members of A
in F ).
UNSAT(F : F, I : I) returning true or false
L0: return true if, for the given interpretation I,
[(I, J) |= F ] = 0. Otherwise, return false.
REWRITE(F : F, I : I, object level : N) returning F ′ : F
L0: F ′ := F .
L1: remove all the non-unit-chains and unit chains
shorter than or equal to object level from F ′. The
removal is in the following sense: if fx ∧ Fx, Fx ∧
fx, fx ∨ Fx or Fx ∨ fx occurs as a sub-formula in
F ′ for fx those just specified, then replace them not
simultaneously but one at a time to Fx until no more
reductions are possible.
L20: For each unit chain f in F
′, Do:
L21: if the head of f is 0 under I, then remove the
unit chain from F ′; else replace the head of f with
⊤.
L22: End of For Loop.
L3: return F ′.
The intuition of the procedure is found within the proof below.
Proposition 7 (Decidability of gradual classical logic):
Complexity of
∮
(F, 0) is at most EXPTIME.
Proof: We show that it is a decision procedure. That the
complexity bound cannot be worse than EXPTIME is clear from
the semantics (for L0) and from the procedure itself. Consider
L0 of the main procedure. This reduces a given formula into a
formula in unit chain expansion. In L1 of the main procedure,
we get a snapshot of the input formula. We extract from
it components of the 0-th object level, and check if it is
(un)satisfiable. The motivation for this operation is as follows:
if the input formula is contradictory at the 0th-object level, the
input formula is contradictory by the definition of J. Since we
are considering validity of a formula, we need to check all
the possible valuation frames. The number is determined by
distinct A elements. L2 gets the number (n). The For loop
starting at L30 iterates through the 2
n distinct interpretations.
If the snapshot is unsatisfiable for any such valuation frame, it
cannot be valid, which in turn implies that the input formula
cannot be valid (L31). If the snapshot is satisfiable and if
the maximum object-level in the input formula is the 0th,
i.e. the snapshot is the input formula, then the input formula
is satisfiable for this particular valuation frame, and so we
check the remaining valuation frames (L32). Otherwise, if it
is satisfiable and if the maximum object-level in the input
formula is not the 0th, then we need to check that snapshots in
all the other object-levels of the input formula are satisfiable
by all the valuation frames. We do this check by recursion
(L33). Notice the first parameter REWRITE(Fa, I, object level)
here. This returns some formula F ′. At the beginning of the
sub-procedure, F ′ is a duplicated copy of Fa (not Fb). Now,
under the particular 0-th object level interpretation I, some unit
chain in Fa may be already evaluated to 0. Then we do not
need consider them at any deeper object-level. So we remove
them from F ′. Otherwise, in all the remaining unit chains, the
0-th object gets local interpretation of 1. So we replace the
S element at the 0-th object level with ⊤ which always gets
1. Finally, all the non-chain S constituents and all the chains
shorter than or equal to object level in Fa are irrelevant at
a higher object-level. So we also remove them (from F ′). We
pass this F ′ and an incremented object level to the main
procedure for the recursion.
The recursive process continues either until a sub-formula
passed to the main procedure turns out to be invalid, in which
case the recursive call returns 0 (L22 and L4 in the main
procedure) to the caller who assigns 0 to o (L24) and again
returns 0, and so on until the first recursive caller. The caller
receives 0 once again to conclude that F is invalid, as expected.
Otherwise, we have that F is valid, for we considered all
the valuation frames. The number of recursive calls cannot
be infinite.
V. CONCLUSION AND RELATED THOUGHTS
There are many existing logics to which gradual classical
logic can relate, including ones below. “G(g)radual classical
logic” is abbreviated by Grad.
A. Para-consistent Logic
In classical logic a contradictory statement implies just
anything expressible in the given domain of discourse. Not so
in the family of para-consistent logics where it is distinguished
from other forms of inconsistency [17]; what is trivially the
case in classical logic, say a1 ∧ a
c
1 ⊃ a2 for any propositions
a1 and a2, is not an axiom. Or, if my understanding about
them is sufficient, it actually holds in the sense that to each
contradiction expressible in a para-consistent logic associates
a sub-domain of discourse within which it entails anything;
however, just as Grad internalises classical logic, so do para-
consistent logics, revealing the extent of the explosiveness
of contradiction within them. In some sense para-consistent
logics model parallel activities as seen in concurrency. What
Grad on the other hand aims to model is conceptual scoping.
As they do not pose an active conflict to each other, it should
be possible to derive an extended logic which benefits from
both features.
B. Epistemic Logic/Conditional Logic
Epistemic logic concerns knowledge and belief, augmenting
propositional logic with epistemic operators Kc for knowledge
and Bc for belief such that Kca/Bca means that a proposition
a is known/believed to be true by an agent c. [13]. Grad
has a strong link to knowledge and belief, being inspired by
tacit agreement on assumptions about attributed objects. To
seek a correspondence, we may tentatively assign to a0 ⋗ a1
a mapping of a0 ∧ Kc/Bca1. However, this mapping is not
very adequate due to the fact that Kc/Bc enforces a global
sense of knowledge/belief that does not update in the course
of discourse. The relation that ⋗ expresses between a0 and
a1 is not captured this way. A more proximate mapping is
achieved with the conditional operator > in conditional logics
[1] with which we may map a0 ⋗ a1 into a0 ∧ (a0 > a1).
But by this mapping the laws of > will no longer follow
any of normal, classical, monotonic or regular (Cf. [7] or
Section 3 in [1]; note that the small letters a, b, c, ... in the
latter reference are not literals but propositional formulas)
conditional logics’. RCEA holds safely, but all the rest: RCEC;
RCM; RCR and RCK fail since availability of some b and c
equivalent in one sub-domain of discourse of Grad does not
imply their equivalence in another sub-domain. Likewise, the
axioms listed in Section 3 of [1] fail save CC (understand it
by a∧ (a > b)∧ a∧ (a > c) ⊃ a∧ (a > b∧ c)), CMon and CM.
Further studies should be useful in order to unravel a logical
perspective into how some facts that act as pre-requisites for
others could affect knowledge and belief.
C. Intensional Logic/Description Logic
Conditional logics were motivated by counterfactuals [16],
[19], e.g. “If X were the case, then Y would be the case.”
According to the present comprehension of the author’s about
reasoning about such statements as found in Appendix J in
the form of an informal essay, the reasoning process involves
transformation of one’s consciousness about the antecedent
that he/she believes is impossible. However, even if we require
the said transformation to be minimal in its rendering the
impossible X possible, we still cannot ensure that we obtain a
unique representation of X, so long as X is not possible. Hence
it is understood to be not what it is unconditionally, but only
what it is relative to a minimal transformation that applied.
The collection of the possible representations is sometimes
described as the extension of X. Of course, one may have
certain intention, under which X refers to some particular
representations of X. They are termed intension of X for
contrast.
The two terms are actively differentiated in Intensional
Logic [5], [8], [18]. For example, suppose that we have two
concepts denoting collections U and V such that their union
is neither U nor V. Then, although U is certainly not equal
to V, if, for instance, we regard every concept as a designator
of an element of the collection, then U is V if U 7→ u and V
7→ v such that u = v. For a comparison, Grad does not treat
intension explicitly, for if some entity equals another in Grad,
then they are always extensionally equal: if the morning star is
the evening star, it cannot be because the two terms designate
the planet Venus that Grad says they are equal, but because
they are the same. But it expresses the distinction passively
in the sense that we can meta-logically observe it. To wit,
consider an expression (⊤ ⋗ Space ⋗ Wide) ∧ (Space ⋗ Wide).
Then, depending on what the given domain of discourse is,
the sense of Space in ⊤ ⋗ Space ⋗ Wide may not be the
same as that of Space in Space ⋗ Wide. Similarly for Wide.
(Incidentally, note that ⋗ is not the type/sub-type relation.)
The intensionality in the earlier mentioned conditional logics
is, provided counterfactual statements are reasoned in line
with the prescription in Appendix J, slightly more explicit:
the judgement of Y depends on intension of X. But in many
of the ontic conditional logics in [1], it does not appear to be
explicitly distinguished from extension.
It could be the case that Grad, once extended with predi-
cates, may be able to express intensionality in a natural way,
e.g. we may say ∃Intension(Adjective ⋗ Sheep) = Ovine
(in some, and not necessarily all, sub-domains of discourse).
At any rate, how much we should care for the distinction
of intensionality and extensionality probably owes much to
personal tastes. We may study intensionality as an inde-
pendent component to be added to extensional logics. We
may alternatively study a logic in which extensionality is
deeply intertwined with intensionality. It should be the sort
of applications we have in mind that favours one to the other.
Of the logics that touch upon concepts, also worth mention-
ing are a family of description logics [2] that have influence
in knowledge representation. They are a fragment of the first-
order logic specialised in setting up knowledge bases, in
reasoning about their contents and in manipulating them [3].
The domain of discourse, a knowledge base, is formed of two
components. One called TBox stores knowledge that does not
usually change over time: (1) concepts (corresponding to unary
predicates in the first-order logic) and (2) roles (corresponding
to binary predicates), specifically. The other one, ABox, stores
contingent knowledge of assertions about individuals, e.g.
Mary, an individual, is mother, a general concept. Given the
domain of discourse, there then are reasoning facilities in
description logics responsible for checking satisfiability of an
expression as well as for judging whether one description is
a sub-/super-concept of another (here a super-concept of a
concept is not “a concept of a concept” in the term of [8]).
Description logics were developed from specific applica-
tions, and capture a rigid sense of the concept. It should be of
interest to see how Grad may be specialised for applications
in computer science. To see if the use of ⋗ as a meta-relation
on description logic instances can lead to results that have
been conventionally difficult to cope with is another hopeful
direction.
D. Combined Logic
Grad is a particular kind of combined logic [4], [6], [9]
combining the same logic over and over finitely many times.
The presence of the extra logical connective ⋗ scarcely diverts
it from the philosophy of combined logics. Instead of regarding
base logics11 as effectively bearing the same significance in
footing, however, this work recognised certain sub-ordination
between base logics, as the new logical connective char-
acterised. Object-attribute negation also bridges across the
base logics. Given these, a finite number of the base logic
combinations at once made more sense than combinations of
two base logics finitely many times, for the latter approach
may not be able to adequately represent the meta-base-logic
logical connectives with the intended semantics of gradual
classical logic. Investigation into this sub-set of combined
logics could have merits of its own.
E. Conclusion
This work presented Grad as a logic for attributed ob-
jects. Its mechanism should be easily integrated into many
non-intuitionistic logics. Directions to future research were
also suggested at lengths through comparisons. Considering
its variations should be also interesting. For applications of
gradual logics, program analysis/verification, databases, and
artificial intelligence come into mind.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
First apply ⋗ reductions 2 and 3 on F1⋗F2 into a formula in
which the only occurrences of the chains are f0 ⋗F2, f1 ⋗F2,
. . . , fk ⋗ F2 for some k ∈ N and some f0, f1, . . . , fk ∈ U ∪ S .
Then apply ⋗ reductions 4 and 5 to each of those chains into
a formula in which the only occurrences of the chains are:
f0⋗g0, f0⋗g1, . . . , f0⋗gj , f1⋗g0, . . . , f1⋗gj , . . . , fk⋗g0, . . . ,
fk ⋗ gj for some j ∈ N and some g0, g1, . . . , gj ∈ U. To each
such chain, apply ⋗ reduction 1 as long as it is applicable.
This process cannot continue infinitely since any formula
is finitely constructed and since, under the premise, we can
apply induction on the number of elements of S occurring
in gx, 0 ≤ x ≤ j. The straightforward inductive proof is
left to readers. The result is a formula in unit chain expansion.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF LEMMA 3
By induction on maximal number of ¬ nestings and a sub-
induction on formula size. We quote Lemma 2 for base cases.
For inductive cases, assume that the current lemma holds true
for all the formulas with neg max(F0) of up to k. Then we
conclude by showing that it still holds true for all the formulas
with neg max(F0) of k+1. Now, because any formula is finitely
constructed, there exist sub-formulas in which occur no ¬. By
Lemma 2, those sub-formulas have a reduction into a formula
in unit chain expansion. Hence it suffices to show that those
formulas ¬F ′ with F ′ already in unit chain expansion reduce
into a formula in unit chain expansion, upon which inductive
hypothesis applies for a conclusion. Consider what F ′ is:
1) s: then apply ¬ reduction 1 on ¬F ′ to remove the ¬
occurrence.
2) Fa∧Fb: apply ¬ reduction 2. Then apply (sub-)induction
hypothesis on ¬Fa and ¬Fb.
3) Fa∨Fb: apply ¬ reduction 3. Then apply (sub-)induction
hypothesis on ¬Fa and ¬Fb.
4) s ⋗ F ∈ U: apply ¬ reduction 4. Then apply (sub-
)induction hypothesis on ¬F .
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF LEMMA 5
(Note again that we are assuming well-formed formulas
only.) For the first one, [M |=D s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · ·⋗ sk] = 1 implies
that I(ǫ, s0) = I(s0, s1) = . . . = I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, sk) = 1. So we
have; I(ǫ, sc0) = I(s0, s
c
1) = · · · = I(s0.s1 . . . .sk−1, s
c
k) = 0 by
the definition of I. Meanwhile, recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗
· · · ⋗ sk) = s
c
0 ∨ (s0 ⋗ ((s
c
1 ∨ (s1 ⋗ · · · )))) = s
c
0 ∨ (s0 ⋗ s
c
1) ∨
(s ⋗ s1 ⋗ s
c
2) ∨ · · · ∨ (s ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk−1 ⋗ s
c
k). Therefore
[M |=D recursiveReduce(s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk)] = 0 6= 1 for
the given valuation frame.
For the second obligation, [M |=D s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk] =
0 implies that [I(ǫ, s0) = 0] ∨
† [I(s0, s1) = 0] ∨
† · · · ∨†
[I(s0.s1. . . . .sk−1, sk) = 0]. Again by the definition of I, we
have the required result. That these two events are mutually
exclusive is trivial.
APPENDIX D: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
Let us generate a set of expressions finitely constructed from
the following grammar;
X := [M |=D f ] | X ∧
† X | X ∨† X where f ∈ U ∪ S .
Then first of all it is straightforward to show that [M |=D Fi] =
Xi for each i ∈ {1, 2, 3} for some X1, X2, X3 that the above
grammar recognises. By Lemma 5 each atomic expression
([M |=D fx] for some fx ∈ U ∪ S) is assigned one and only
one value v ∈ {0, 1} (again note that we are considering well-
formed formulas only). Then since 1∨† 1 = 1∨† 0 = 0∨† 1 = 1,
0 ∧† 0 = 0 ∧† 1 = 1 ∧† 0 = 0, and 1 ∧† 1 = 1 by definition
given at the beginning of this section, it is also the case that
[M |=D Fi] is assigned one and only one value vi ∈ {0, 1} for
each i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then the proof for the current proposition
is straightforward.
APPENDIX E: PROOF OF LEMMA 6
recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F )) =
recursiveReduce(sc0∨(s0⋗s
c
1)∨· · ·∨(s0⋗s1⋗· · ·⋗sk−1⋗s
c
k)) =
s0∧ (s
c
0 ∨ (s0⋗ s1))∧ (s
c
0 ∨ (s0⋗ s
c
1)∨ (s0⋗ s1⋗ s2))∧· · · ∧ (s
c
0 ∨
(s0⋗s
c
1)∨· · ·∨(s0⋗s1⋗ · · ·⋗sk−2⋗s
c
k−1)∨(s0⋗s1⋗ · · ·⋗sk)).
Here, assume that the right hand side of the equation which is
in conjunctive normal form is ordered, the number of terms,
from left to right, strictly increasing from 1 to k + 1. Then
as the result of a transformation of the conjunctive normal
form into disjunctive normal form we will have 1 (the choice
from the first conjunctive clause which contains only one
term s0) × 2 (a choice from the second conjunctive clause
with 2 terms sc0 and s0 ⋗ s1) × . . .× (k + 1) clauses. But
almost all the clauses in [M |=D (the disjunctive normal form)]
will be assigned 0 (trivial; the proof left to readers) so
that we gain [M |=D (the disjunctive normal form)] = [M |=D
s0] ∧
† [M |=D s0 ⋗ s1] ∧
† · · · ∧† [M |=D s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk] =
[M |=D s0 ⋗ s1 ⋗ · · · ⋗ sk].
APPENDIX F: PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6
Firstly for 1 = [M |=D F ∨ recursiveReduce(F )].
By Proposition 4, F has a disjunctive normal form:
F =
∨k
i=0
∧hi
j=0
fij for some i, j, k ∈ N, some h0, · · · , hk ∈ N
and some f00, · · · , fkhk ∈ U∪S . Then recursiveReduce(F ) =∧k
i=0
∨hi
j=0
recursiveReduce(fij), which, if transformed into
a disjunctive normal form, will have (h0 + 1) [a choice from
recursiveReduce(f00), recursiveReduce(f01), . . . ,
recursiveReduce(f0h0)] × (h1 + 1) [a choice from
recursiveReduce(f10), recursiveReduce(f11), . . . ,
recursiveReduce(f1h1)] × · · ·× (hk + 1) clauses. Now if
[M |=D F ] = 1, then we already have the required result.
Therefore suppose that [M |=D F ] = 0. Then it holds that
∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.∃j ∈ {0, . . . , hi}.([M |=D fij ] = 0). But by
Lemma 5, this is equivalent to saying that ∀i ∈ {0, . . . , k}.∃j ∈
{0, . . . , hi}.([M |=D recursiveReduce(fij)] = 1). But
then there exists a clause in disjunctive normal form of
[M |=D recursiveReduce(F )] which is assigned 1. Dually for
0 = [M |=D F ∧ recursiveReduce(F )].
For [M |=D F ] = [M |=D
recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F ))], by Proposition 4, F
has a disjunctive normal form: F =
∨k
i=0
∧hi
j=0
fij for some
i, j, k ∈ N, some h0, . . . , hk ∈ N and some f00, . . . , fkhk ∈ U∪S .
Then recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(F )) =∨k
i=0
∧hi
j=0
recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(fij)). But by
Lemma 6 [M |=D recursiveReduce(recursiveReduce(fij))] =
[M |=D fij ] for each appropriate i and j. Straightforward.
APPENDIX G: PROOF OF LEMMA 7
By induction on the number of reduction steps and a sub-
induction on formula size, we first establish that F(F1) =
F(F2) (by bisimulation). Into one way to show that to each
reduction on F ′ corresponds reduction(s) on F is straightfor-
ward, for we can choose to reduce F into F ′, thereafter we
synchronize both of the reductions. Into the other way to show
that to each reduction on F corresponds reduction(s) on F ′,
we consider each case:
1) The first pair.
a) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which
neither is a sub-formula of the shown sub-formula
nor has as its sub-formula the shown sub-formula,
then we reduce the same sub-formula in F ′. Induc-
tion hypothesis (note that the number of reduction
steps is that of F into this direction).
b) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fa or Fb then
we reduce the same sub-formula of Fa or Fb in F
′.
Induction hypothesis.
c) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fc then we
reduce the same sub-formula of both occurrences
of Fc in F
′. Induction hypothesis.
d) If ⋗ reduction 2 takes place on F such that we
have; F [(Fa ∧Fb)⋗Fc] Fx[(Fa⋗Fc)∧ (Fb⋗Fc)]
where F and Fx differ only by the shown sub-
formulas,12 then do nothing on F ′. And Fx = F
′.
Vacuous thereafter.
e) If ⋗ reduction 2 takes place on F such that we
have; F [(Fd ∧Fe)⋗Fc] Fx[(Fd⋗Fc)∧ (Fe⋗Fc)]
where Fd 6= Fa and Fd 6= Fb, then without loss
of generality assume that Fd ∧ Fβ = Fa and that
Fβ ∧Fb = Fe. Then we apply ⋗ reduction 2 on the
(Fd∧Fβ)⋗Fc in F
′ so that we have; F ′[((Fd∧Fβ)⋗
Fc)∧(Fb⋗Fc)] F
′′[(Fd⋗Fc)∧(Fβ⋗Fc)∧(Fb⋗Fc)].
Since (Fx[(Fd ⋗ Fc) ∧ (Fe ⋗ Fc)] =)Fx[(Fd ⋗ Fc) ∧
((Fβ ∧Fb)⋗Fc)] = F
′
x[(Fβ ∧Fb)⋗Fc] and F
′′[(Fd⋗
Fc)∧(Fβ⋗Fc)∧(Fb⋗Fc)] = F
′′′[(Fβ⋗Fc)∧(Fb⋗Fc)]
such that F ′′′ and F ′x differ only by the shown sub-
formulas, we repeat the rest of simulation on F ′x
and F ′′′. Induction hypothesis.
f) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp
of F in which the shown sub-formula of F oc-
curs as a strict sub-formula (F [(Fa ∧ Fb) ⋗ Fc] =
F [Fp[(Fa ∧ Fb) ⋗ Fc]]), then we have F [Fp[(Fa ∧
Fb) ⋗ Fc]]  Fx[Fq [(Fa ∧ Fb) ⋗ Fc]]. But we have
12This note ‘where . . . ’ is assumed in the remaining.
F ′ = F ′[F ′p[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]]. Therefore we
apply the same reduction on F ′p to gain; F
′[F ′p[(Fa⋗
Fc) ∧ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]]  F
′
x[F
′
p′ [(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ (Fb ⋗ Fc)]].
Induction hypothesis.
2) The second, the third and the fourth pairs: Similar.
3) The fifth pair:
a) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which
neither is a sub-formula of the shown sub-formula
nor has as its sub-formula the shown sub-formula,
then we reduce the same sub-formula in F ′. Induc-
tion hypothesis.
b) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fa, Fb or
Fc, then we reduce the same sub-formula of all
the occurrences of the shown Fa, Fb or Fc in F
′.
Induction hypothesis.
c) If ⋗ reduction 4 takes place on F such that we
have; F [(Fa ⋗ Fb) ⋗ Fc]  Fx[(Fa ⋗ Fc) ∧ ((Fa ⋗
Fb)∨ (Fa ⋗Fb ⋗Fc))], then do nothing on F
′. And
Fx = F
′. Vacuous thereafter.
d) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp of
F in which the shown sub-formula of F occurs as
a strict sub-formula, then similar to the case 1) f).
By the result of the above bisimulation, we now have
F(F ) = F(F ′). However, without ¬ occurrences in F it takes
only those 5 ⋗ reductions to derive a formula in unit chain
expansion; hence we in fact have F(F ) = F(Fx) for some
formula Fx in unit chain expansion. But then by Theorem
1, there could be only one value out of {0, 1} assigned to
[M |=D Fx] if Fx is well-formed; otherwise, illFormed is
assigned.
APPENDIX H: PROOF OF LEMMA 8
By simultaneous induction on reduction steps and by a
sub-induction on formula size. One way is trivial. Into the
direction to showing that to every reduction on F corresponds
reduction(s) on F ′, we consider each case. For the first case;
1) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which neither
is a sub-formula of the shown sub-formula nor has as
its sub-formula the shown sub-formula, then we reduce
the same sub-formula in F ′. Induction hypothesis.
2) If it takes place on a sub-formula of Fa or Fb then we
reduce the same sub-formula of Fa or Fb in F
′. Induction
hypothesis.
3) If ¬ reduction 2 takes place on F such that we have;
F [¬(Fa ∧ Fb)] Fx[¬Fa ∨ ¬Fb], then do nothing on F
′.
And Fx = F
′. Vacuous thereafter.
4) If ¬ reduction 2 takes place on F such that we have;
F [¬(Fd ∧ Fe)]  Fx[¬Fd ∨ ¬Fe] where Fd 6= Fa and
Fd 6= Fb, then without loss of generality assume that
Fd ∧ Fβ = Fa and that Fβ ∧ Fb = Fe. Then we apply ¬
reduction 2 on the ¬(Fd ∧ Fβ) in F
′ so that we have;
F ′[¬(Fd ∧ Fβ) ∨ ¬Fb]  F
′′[¬Fd ∨ ¬Fβ ∨ ¬Fb]. Since
(Fx[¬Fd ∨¬Fe] =)Fx[¬Fd ∨¬(Fβ ∧Fb)] = F
′
x[¬(Fβ ∧Fb]
and F ′′[¬Fd ∨ ¬Fβ ∨ ¬Fb] = F
′′′[¬Fβ ∨ ¬Fb] such that
F ′′′ and F ′x differ only by the shown sub-formulas, we
repeat the rest of simulation on F ′x and F
′′′. Induction
hypothesis.
5) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp of F
in which the shown sub-formula of F occurs as a strict
sub-formula, then similar to the 1) f) sub-case in Lemma
7.
The second case is similar. For the third case;
1) If no reduction is applicable, then vacuously [M |=D
F ] = [M |=D F
′].
2) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula which neither
is a sub-formula of the shown sub-formula nor has as
its sub-formula the shown sub-formula, then we reduce
the same sub-formula in F ′. Induction hypothesis.
3) If a reduction takes place on a sub-formula Fp of F in
which the shown sub-formula of F occurs as a strict
sub-formula, then;
a) If the applied reduction is ¬ reduction 2 or 4, then
straightforward.
b) If the applied reduction is ¬ reduction 3 such that
(F = Fa[¬(Fx ∨ s ∨ s ∨ Fy)])  (Fb[¬Fx ∧ ¬s ∧
¬s ∧ ¬Fy] = Fc[¬s ∧ ¬s])  Fd[s
c ∧ sc] for some
Fx and Fy (the last transformation does not cost
generality due to simultaneous induction), then we
reduce F ′ as follows: (F ′ = F ′a[¬(Fx ∨ s∨ Fy)]) 
(F ′b[¬Fx ∧ ¬s ∧ ¬Fy] = F
′
c[¬s]) F
′
d[s
c]. Induction
hypothesis. Any other cases are straightforward.
c) If the applied reduction is ⋗ reduction 1-4, then
straightforward.
Similarly for the remaing ones.
APPENDIX I: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
By induction on maximal number of ¬ nestings and a sub-
induction on formula size. We quote Lemma 9 for base cases.
For inductive cases, assume that the current theorem holds
true for all the formulas with neg max(F0) of up to k. Then
we conclude by showing that it still holds true for all the
formulas with neg max(F0) of k + 1. First we note that there
applies no ¬ reductions on ¬Fx if Fx is a chain whose head
is not an element of S . But this is straightforward from the
descriptions of the reduction rules.
On this observation we show that if we have a sub-formula
¬Fx such that no ¬ occurs in Fx, then Fx can be reduced into
a formula in unit chain expansion with no loss of generality,
prior to the reduction of the outermost ¬. Then we have the
desired result by induction hypothesis and the results in the
previous sub-section. But suppose otherwise. Let us denote by
F the set of formulas in unit chain expansion that ¬F ′x reduces
into where F ′x is a unit chain expansion of Fx. Now suppose
there exists Fy in unit chain expansion that ¬Fx can reduce
into if the outermost ¬ reduction applies before Fx has reduced
into a formula in unit chain expansion such as to satisfy that
[M |=D Fy ] 6= [M |=D Fβ] for some Fβ ∈ F . We here have;
¬Fx  
∗
{⋗reductions only} ¬Fz  
∗
{⋗reductions only} ¬F
′
x  
+
{¬ reductions only}
Fβ
and ¬Fx  
∗
{⋗ reductions only} ¬Fz  ¬ reduction F
′
z  
∗ Fy where
¬†∃Fzz.F
′
z = ¬Fzz .
Hence for our supposition to hold, it must satisfy that there
exists no bisimulation between F ′z and ¬Fz . But because it is
trivially provable that to each reduction on F ′z corresponds
reduction(s) on ¬Fz (, for we can choose to apply the ¬
reduction on ¬Fz to gain F
′
z,) it must in fact satisfy that
not to each reduction on ¬Fz corresponds reduction(s) on F
′
z .
Consider what reduction applies on a sub-formula of ¬Fz:
1) any ¬ reduction: Then the reduction generates F ′z. A
contradiction to supposition has been drawn.
2) ⋗ reduction 1: Consider how Fz looks like:
a) Fz = F1[(Fu ⋗ Fv) ⋗ Fw] ∧ F2: But then the same
reduction can take place on F ′z = ¬F1[(Fu ⋗ Fv)⋗
Fw] ∨ ¬F2. Contradiction.
b) Fz = F1 ∧ F2[(Fu ⋗ Fv)⋗ Fw]: Similar.
c) Fz = F1[(Fu ⋗ Fv)⋗ Fw] ∨ F2: Similar.
d) Fz = F1 ∨ F2[(Fu ⋗ Fv)⋗ Fw]: Similar.
e) Fz = (Fu⋗Fv)⋗Fw: This case is impossible due to
the observation given earlier in the current proof.
f) Fz = (F1[(Fu ⋗ Fv)⋗ Fw] ⋗ F2)⋗ F3: Similar.
g) The rest: all similar.
3) ⋗ reduction 2: Similar.
4) ⋗ reduction 3: Similar.
5) ⋗ reduction 4: Consider how Fz looks like:
a) Fz = s⋗(F1∧F2): Then ¬Fz  ¬((s⋗F1)∧(s⋗F2)).
But by Lemma 8, it does not cost generality if we
reduce the ¬ to have; ¬((s ⋗ F1) ∧ (s ⋗ F2))  
¬(s⋗F1)∨¬(s⋗F2). Meanwhile F
′
z = s
c∨(s⋗¬(F1∧
F2)). By Lemma 8, it does not cost generality if
we have F ′′z = s
c∨ (s⋗ (¬F1∨¬F2)) instead of F
′
z .
But it also does not cost generality (by Lemma
7) if we have F ′′′z = s
c ∨ (s ⋗ ¬F1) ∨ (s ⋗ ¬F2)
instead of F ′′z . But by Lemma 8, it again does not
cost generality if we have F ′′′′z = s
c ∨ (s⋗ ¬F1) ∨
sc ∨ (s ⋗ ¬F2) instead. Therefore we can conduct
bisimulation between ¬(s⋗ F1) and s
c ∨ (s⋗¬F1)
and between ¬(s⋗F2) and s
c∨(s⋗¬F2). Since each
of ¬(s ⋗ F1) and ¬(s ⋗ F2) has a strictly smaller
formula size than ¬(s⋗ (F1 ∧F2)), (sub-)induction
hypothesis. Contradiction.
b) The rest: Trivial.
6) ⋗ reduction 5: Similar.
APPENDIX J: AN ESSAY ON REASONING ABOUT
COUNTERFACTUALS
Conditional logics were motivated by counterfactuals. What
follows is but a personal viewpoint on the process of reasoning
about counterfactuals. Earlier ideas in the line of Stalnaker’s
and others’ [1] helped sharpen this view. An essential purpose
of reasoning about counterfactuals is, to the author at least, in
conducting a partial examination on the faculty of our imagi-
nation. A ‘flying emu’ which is considered to be non-existing
can be, despite all the contradictions that the term causes
against what we find within the knowledge, accommodated
in our imagination. There what the knowledge says is the
state of being flying and what it says is something that is
an emu are refined into combinable forms so that a flying
emu comes to existence within the parallel consciousness.
But because it does not exist in the knowledge, taken two
volunteers who are for simplicity supposed sharing the same
knowledge, even if the flying emu in imagination of one of
them does not coincide in features with that in the other, they
cannot be said to be unjustifiable as a proper representation
for the mismatch found between them, since no definition of
a flying emu is in any case found in the knowledge. Taken
countably many volunteers, it comes of no surprise if the
number of representations of a flying emu is also countably
many, each one of which is justified as a proper in each
respective imagination space. Therefore, for counterfactuals
in particular out of other forms that imagination enables us,
if we have “If there were a flying emu, then Y would be the
case,” one plausible way of obtaining the truth value for this
expression is as stated in the following pseudocode:
(Pre-condition)
Some domain of discourse D is given. For intuition,
assume that D represents the mind of an individual.
D is assumed to be a logical space. Knowledge is
what holds in D in which, like in gradual classical
logic, nothing can designate a unique and indivisible
object (Cf. Introduction and Postulate 1): any one of
them may be precise enough but never unique. We
suppose that ‘emu’ and ‘the state of being flying’ are
in the knowledge.
L1 If either ‘flying emu’ or Y holds in knowledge, then
return false.
L2 Duplicate knowledge. Apply a function F: knowl-
edge → knowledge such that F(duplicated space) ⊆
knowledge. The F(duplicated space) is what we here
call imagination.
L3 Let us mean by refinement of an element in imagina-
tion its enlargement by means of any element(s) that
are presently found in imagination acting upon it in
the manner lawful to D. In this term of refinement,
keep refining elements of imagination insofar as such
refinement is strictly necessary to generate a flying
emu in the imagination. Call the state of the updated
imagination Im if it is not inconsistent. Here, by
such a refinement being strictly necessary, we mean
that (1) the flying emu in Im ceases to exist if the
last change that was taken to derive Im is undone,
and that (2) any changes made to the elements
of (Im\{flying emu})\(knowledge) cannot be any
smaller for the particular flying emu to not cease
to exist.
L41 If there is no such Im, that is, if no imagination
space in which a flying emu exists derives from
the duplicated knowledge following the prescribed
alteration process such that it be contained within
the boundary of D, then return true.
L42 For each such Im, do:
L43 If Y is not the case in Im, then return false.
L44 End of For loop
L5 Return true.
A couple of relevant points are: (1) If a counterfactual a > b is
true as judged by the above pseudo-code, then it is true by the
sense delimited by D. (2) A counterfactual is an impossible
case: if it were possible, it would not be a counterfactual.
Hence if by a possible world we mean to refer to a world
which may just as feasibly exist as our own world, there is no
possible world that makes the antecedent of the counterfactual
true, for if in some possible alternative world the antecedent
were true, the statement would not be a counterfactual to
the reasoning body, which goes against the supposition that
it is a counterfactual. The antecedent is always false in
every alternative world that a reasoning body could consider
possible. (3) Under the stated truth judgement, we have that
¬(a > b) is true if and only if it is not the case that a > b is
true.
